University of Miami Law Review
Volume 1

Number 1

Article 8

3-1-1947

The Gift Tax and Divorce Settlements

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr

Recommended Citation
The Gift Tax and Divorce Settlements, 1 U. Miami L. Rev. 40 (1947)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol1/iss1/8

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
library@law.miami.edu.

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. I

because of the inhibitions of Sec. 708.07, Florida Statutes, 1941." The
Court held that this section had not been modified or superseded by
certain other sections of tile Florida Statutes," and then laid down the
doctrine that contracts to convey must "be executed and acknowledged
in the form prescribed for conveyances of real property," in order to be
specifically enforced."
The decision apparently completely ignores the provisions of the 1943
act with reference to married women's acknowledgments, though that
act by its terms makes such acknowledgments no "part of the execution
of any such instrument" and by its terms includes "contracts for the
sale of lands" in its provisions." The 1943 act specifically repealed all
laws in conflict with it,"' and it would seem that this provision should
serve to repeal the acknowledgment requirement of Sec. 708.07 since
that section was made a part of the law in 1892."
The Supreme Court has not chosen to take this position, and as a
result Berlin v. Jacobs destroys much of the usefulness of the 1943
acknowledgment act. While the opinion does not hold the contract
void, it denies the holder the right to enforce the same by court proceedings, and thereby reaches the same result.
As a consequence, a shadow is thrown over the entire provisions of
the 1943 act, and the coming legislature would (1o well to make such
amendments as are necessary to Sec. 708.07 and other sections of the
statutes to make them conform without possible question to the progressive spirit of the 1943 act.

THE GIFT TAX AND DIVORCE SETTLEMENTS
Few meii when making a transfer of property under a divorce
settlement feel that they are making a "gift". More often than not
they feel that they are meeting the hard terms of a closely-bargained
contract. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is not interested,
however, in the transferor's subjective feelings in such a matter. He
Sec. 708.07, Fla. Stat. 1941: "Coverture shall not prevent a decree
against husband and wife to specifically perform their written agreement to sell or convey the separate property of the wife, or to relinquish
her right of dower in the property of the husband, but no agreement for
the sale or conveyance of her real property or for relinquishment of
dower, shall be specifically enforced unless it be executed and acknowledged in the form prescribed for conveyances of her real property and
for relinquishment of dower."
11 See. 708.08, 708.09, 708,10, Fla. Stat. 1941 as amended by Laws 1943
c. 21932 and 21696.
Berlin v. Jacobs, supra., p. 718.
Sec. 693.03, Fla. Stat. 1941 as amended by Laws 194,3 c. 21746
par. 1-3. ef. Note 1.
"
Laws 1943, c. 21746, sec. 3.
22 Rev. Stat. 1892, see. 2076.
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is interested in the substance of the transaction, and in a recent ruling'
has indicated a renewed determination to subject such transfers to the
federal gift tax. At the same time lie has brought into greater harmony
the application to divorce settlements of the gift tax and the estate tax.'
The controversy over the taxing of divorce settlements heretofore
has centered chiefly around whether or not a divorce settlement is a
transier for "money or money's worth", and whether it is "a transaction
which is bona fide, at arm's length".' The Tax Court has consistently
maintained that it is;' the Commissioner has consistently maintained
that it is not.' The Treasur now recedes fron this position in the new
ruling. The Commissioner had argued previously that divorce settlemiients were in consideration of the "relinquishment of . . . marital rights"
in the husband's "property or estate", that such a relinquishment was
riot a consideration "nii money or InIOrmeyUs worth" for estate tax purposes
by specific statutory provision.' and that by analogy it should inot be so
Considered for gift tax purposes.
E. T. 19, Int. Rev. Bull., 46-16-12367. The key sentence of the ruling
is: "With respect to transfers made pursuant to legal separation agreements or divorce decrees, it is the position of the Bureau that, for both
estate and gift tax purposes, a release of support rights may constitute
a consideration in money or money's worth."
I See Rudick, Marriage,Divorce and Taxes, (1947) 2 Tax Law Review
123, 158.
1 Section 1002 of the Internal Revenue Code provides: "Where property is transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth, then the amount by which the value of the
property exceeded the value of the consideration shall . . . be deemed
a gift . . ." Regulation 108, Section 86.8, provides: " ... a sale, exchange,
or other transfer of property made in the ordinary course of business
(a transaction which is bona fide, at arm's length, and free from any
donative intent), will be considered as made for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's' worth . . ."
I Herbert Jones, 1 TC 1207 (1943); Edmund C. Converse, 4 (CC)
TC, Dec. 14, 813 (1945); Mathew Lahti, 4 (CCH) TC, Dec. 14, 914 (1946);
Clarence B. Mitchell, Dec. 4 (CCH) TC, Dec. 14, 954 (1946); Julien H.
Hill, 5 (CCH) TC, Dec. 14, 974 (1946); Lewis Case Ledyard, 5 (CCH)
TC, Dec. 15, 087 (1946).
See Notices of Non-Acquiescence. Int. Rev. Bul. Cum. 1944, 41;
Int. Rev. Bull. Cum. 1946-1, 5.
Section 812B of the Internal Revenue Code provides: "A relinquishment or promised relinquishment of dower, curtesy, or of a statutory
estate created in lieu of dower or curtesy, or of other marital rights in
the decedent's property or estate, shall not be considered to any extent
a consideration 'in money or money's worth'." This Section of the Code
concerning estate taxes has now been read in toto into Section 1002
concerning gift taxes quoted above. Merrill v. Fals (1945) 324 U. S.
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Despite the Tax Court's position on1gift taxes, decisions prior to the
new ruling had held that the estate tax did apply to divorce settlements
which were not formalized or confirmed by a court decree.' It did not
apply, however, to divorce settlements ordered by a court or to private
settlements embodied in a court decree.' The effort of the Commissioner
thus had been two-fold: (I) To apply the estate tax rule to all divorce
settlements whether or rot embodied in a court decree, and (2) whether
arising under the gift tax or the estate tax. Since this position was never
established, the law concerning taxation of divorce settlements prior to
the new ruling was in the following confused state:
Gift Tax
Estate Tax
1. In a Court Decree
....
Not taxable
Not taxable
2. Not in a Court Decree .
Not taxable
Taxable
On its face, the effect of the new ruling is that the Treasury recedes
from position 2 above insofar as estate taxes are concerned, so that all
divorce settlements are now taxed alike. The Treasury is here receding,
however, from a hard won position, fortified by several CCA decisions.
It can be assumed that it is withdrawing ondy to attack vith renewed
effort on a different front. The mew method of attack on divorce
settlements is clearly indicated in the following section of the new
Treasury Ruling:
To the extent that a transfer does not exceed the reasonable value of the support rights of the wife it is to be treated as
iiade for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth. The question whether the transfer is in excess of reasonable
support rights is for the determination of the Bureau. That portion
of any transfer which is allocable to the release by the wife of her
property or inheritancre rights is to he considered as not made 'to
any extent' for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth."
"The estahlishment of a reasonable allocation is regarded as a
proper matter for administrative determination by the Bureau in
308: Commissioner v. Wemyss (1945) 324 U. S.303. The effect of these
two eases is to make allsettlements before or at marriage clearly
taxable as gifts.
I Meyer's Estate v. Commissioner, 110 F. (2d) 367, (CCA 2d 1940),
cert. denied, 310 U. S. 687; Helvering v. U. S. Trust Co., 111 F. (2d)
576, (COA 2d 1940), cart. denied, 311 U. S. 678; Markwell v. Commissioner, 112 F. (2d) 253, (CCA 7th 1940); Adriance v. Higgins, 113 F.
(2d) 1013, (CCA 2d 1940); William Weiser, 39 BTA 1144 (1939).
1 F. B. Grinnell, 44 BTA 1286 (1941), aI'd sub nomine Commissioner
v. State Street Trust Co., 128 F. (2d) 618, (CCA 1st 1942): Fleming v.
Yoke, 53 F. Supp. 552 (D.C.N.D. W. Va., 1944), aff'd. 1945 F. (2d)
472 (CCA 4th, 1944); Edythe C. Young, 39 BTA 230 (1939); Estate of
Silas B. Mason, 43 BTA 813 (1941); Estate of A. 0. Smith, 4 (CCH) CT
Dec. 14, 567 (M) (1945); Estate of P. M. Maresi, 5 (CCHI) CT Dec. 15,
051 (M) (1946).
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the absence of a reasonable allocation or segregation by the parties.
In making this determination the facts and circumstances of each
case will be separately considered. Elements to be considered are
the armouni of the husband's annual income, the extent of his
assets, also the life expectancies of the parties and the probability of
the wi/e's remarriage, aliniony almost universally being limited to
such periods. An agreement of the parties may provide for payments extending beyond the period of their joint lives. The required
allocation in such a case wil] involve a determination of the question whether the aggregate amounts paid and payable exceed
normal support rights, which ordinarily would terminate upon the
death of the husband. The contingency of the wife's remarriage
may be measured by actuarial standards." (Italics added.)
The earlier tax assaults on divorce settlements had attempted to tax
the entire transfer. No attempt seems to have been made to divide a
settlement into (a) settlement for relinquishment of dower, widow's
share, and other "marital rights" in the husband's property, and (b)
settlement for right to support and maintenance. The Treasury has
now decided to split divorce settlements through an "administrative
determination by the Bureau in the absence of a reasonable allocation
or segregation by the parties", and to levy a tax on a portion of such
settlements. Earlier cases' are thus to he disregarded only "to the
extent that they hold that the right of a divorced wife to support from
a former husband during the joint lives of the parties is a marital right
in his property or estate".'' Any portion of a divorce settlement which
is attributable to a settlement for relinquishment of dower or other
similar rights will be continued to be considered a taxable transfer
not made for "money or money's worth". Henceforth, therefore, a taxpayer who has made a divorce settlement must prove to the government
the value of his divorced wife's right to support and maintenance. If
this is riot done to the government's satisfaction, the Bureau will make
the determination of the value of this right and may thereby levy a
gift tax on the donor of a divorce settlement for a large portion of
the transfer.
See footnote 7,
E. T. 19, Int. Rev. Bull. 46-16-12367.

